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INTANGIBLE VALUES IN REORGANIZATION
Luther D. Swanstrom*
T HE ULTIMATE boundaries of reorganization law, the latter
stemming from the constitutional power over bankruptcy
legislation, do not yet appear to have been revealed. Judicial
expressions concerning the Congressional effort to provide a
modern reorganization machinery, revealed through Chapter X
of the Chandler Act, seem to leave many questions unanswered.
Among them, especially concerning the plan of reorganization,
are such points as (1) what constitutes sufficient consideration
from equity interests to allow the holders thereof to participate
in the plan; (2) have large percentages of acceptance any value
or weight in the determination whether a proposed plan should
be approved; and (3) should the interests of creditors, paramount
as they are in a statutory reorganization, yield before a judicial
determination that the plan is unfair as a matter of law?
Questions of that character arise because Congress declared
that: "The judge shall confirm a plan if satisfied that . . . (2)
the plan is fair and equitable, and feasible."' As that provision
possesses mandatory effect,2 the courts have taken to themselves
the duty of deciding first that the proposed plan is "fair and
equitable," and second that it is "feasible." Since the latter
calls for the exercise of a business judgment rather than a legal
one, there has been little tendency on the part of the courts to
pass upon the question of the feasibility of any particular planA
With respect to the former, however, courts have not been so reti-
cent since the decision in Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products
* Member, Illinois Bar: author, Chapter X-Corporate Reorganization Under the
Federal Statute (Foundation Press, Chicago, 1938) ; "Reorganization Under the
Federal Statutes," 17 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVMW 1 (1938).
i 11 U. S. C. A. § 621.
2 Brown v. Gerdes. 321 U. S. 178, 64 S. Ct. 487, 88 L. Ed. 659 (1944).
.In the case of In re Dover Boiler Works. 38 F. Supp. 701 at 706 (1941), the
court said it was "leaving to the creditors and stockholders . . . the question of the
economic business wisdom of the plan proposed."
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Coinpany,4 which case construed the effect of similar phraseology
in former Section 77B.5 It was there stated that the words "fair
and equitable" were words of art which had acquired a fixed
meaning through prior judicial interpretation, words which meant,
regardless of common understanding, that a plan which deviated
from the "strict priority" rule, developed by a divided court in
the days of equity reorganizations,6 was necessarily unfair and
inequitable as a matter of law. The fact that large percentages
of the interested persons had voted in favor of the plan there
concerned was deemed to be no criterion as to its fairness.
In the wake of that decision, and particularly in cases involv-
ing Section 221(2) of Chapter X of the Chandler Act, have come
such statements as that the test of fairness and equitable treat-
ment applies alike to both solvent and insolvent corporations ;7
that prior rights must be observed and cannot be sacrificed while
equity interests go unchanged ;8 that a court may not discriminate
between members of the same class or classify creditors arbi-
trarily without due regard to economic status;' but that it is not
4 308 U. S. 106. 60 S. Ct. 1. 84 L. Ed. 110 (1939). rehearing denied 308 U. S. 637,
60 S. Ct. 258, 84 L. Ed. 529 (1939). Justice Douglas. on the Supreme Court but a
short time when he wrote the opinion, came to the bench from the chairmanship of
the Securities and Exchange Commission. This commission, prior to 1938. had con-
ducted its own survey of practices under Section 77B and had published an exhaus-
tive report which levelled its principal attack on past management and its alleged
control of reorganization proceedings. Surprising to many active practitioners in
the field, the new concept in sequestration proceedings of continuing the debtor in
possession was condemned even though many judges had encouraged the practice in
the interest of economy of time and money as well as to preserve the good-will of
the debtor's business. The ideas of the commission, revealed in such survey, ex-
tended into the revised act and appear in the provisions for a disinterested trustee
with the duty to prepare the plan and the many provisions for investigation of past
management. The various dicta of Justice Douglas in the Los Angeles Lumber
Products Co. case must be read against this background.
,11 U. S. C. A. § 207(f) (1).
Northern P. R. Co. v. Boyd. 228 U. S. 482, 33 S. Ct. 554, 57 L. Ed. 931 (1913).
7 In re Consolidated Rock Products Co., 114 F. (2d) 102 (1940), affirmed in 312
V. S. 510, 61 S. Ct. 675, 85 L. Ed. 982 (1941).
s Ibid. See also In re United Light & Power Co., 51 F. Supp. 217 (1943), affirmed
in 142 F. (2d) 411 (1944). and in 323 U. S. 624, 65 S. Ct. 483, 89 L. Ed. 511 (1945) ;
Whitmore Plaza Corporation v. Smith, 113 F. (2d) 210 (1940). The mere contingent
possibility of violation of prior rights is not enough, however, according to In re
Universal Lubricating Systems, 150 F. (2d) 832 (1945), cert. den. 326 U. S. 744, 66
S. Ct. 58, 90 L. Ed. (adv.) 45 (1945).
9 Geist v. Prudence Realization Corp.. 122 F. (2d) 503 (1941), affirmed in 316
U. S. 89, 62 S. Ct. 978, 86 L. Ed. 1293 (1942). See also In re Janson Steel & Iron
Co.. 47 F. Supp. 652 (1942).
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necessary that the plan be the fairest one that could be drafted. 10
All these, and other, pronouncements have been made upon the
basis that whether a given plan should be approved because "fair
and equitable" is a matter of law to be determined by a court
without regard to the expressed wishes of large majorities of the
interested parties.
As the reorganization statute was enacted for the special
benefit of the businessman, he should not lightly surrender to the
lawyer and the court the part Congress has assigned to him. For
that matter, public interest, recognized by assigning to the Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission a function in the proceedings, 1
should not be lightly cast aside. If the plan is "fair and equi-
table" in the eyes of those most vitally concerned, it comes with
some surprise to be told that it cannot be approved because it is
not so regarded by those concerned with the question solely as an
exercise in law. Creditors, realizing that the wastage of liquida-
tion is often as irredeemable as that of war, well may express
astonishment to be told that because "bondholders might fare
worse as a result of a foreclosure and liquidation than they would
by taking a debtor's plan"1 2 still that fact has no relevant bear-
ing on whether a proposed plan meets the test of the statute when
so interpreted.
Only the bankruptcy power can afford protection to both
debtor and creditor against the needless waste produced by an
unwise use of credit. Financial crises which have threatened the
life of the Republic have been tempered by bankruptcy measures
enacted from time to time, but it was not until the depression of
the '30's that Congress responded to the emergency by passing
laws which went beyond the stage of mere composition. Even the
Supreme Court has noted that the constitutional power has not
1oIn re Radio-Keith-Orpheum Corporation. 106 F. (2d) 22 (1939). cert. den. 30S
U. S. 622, 60 S. Ct. 377, 84 L. Ed. 519 (1940).
11 11 U. S. C. A. § 572.
12 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 10c at 123, 60 S. Ct. 1,
84 L. Ed. 110 at 124 (1939).
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been enlarged, but merely given wider exercise with each new
measure. 13 By so doing, Congress called upon all to make conces-
sions of the kind often necessary to maintain the body politic."
It is regrettable that the courts have been hesitant in following
the expressed intention of Congress designed to so enlarge the
scope of the reorganization process that it might become a vital
force in our economy.
The depression years are past, but a new phase is beginning
with the business reconversion following upon a war-time expan-
sion. With the removal of protective controls and subsidies.
optimistic results are expected but private enterprise is re-
emerging in a climate rendered unhealthy by labor monopolies
and trends toward socialism and collectivism. Business casualties
are inevitable. What consideration, then, should be given to a
wise evaluation of the assets, the past earning records and the
future earning prospects of these prospective Chapter X debtors;
what recognition should be accorded to the value of past manage-
ment in aiding the process of rehabilitation; what allowance ought
to be made to equity interests unfortunately facing destruction?
If judicial hesitation and tentative fumbling nullify the Con-
gressional intent by untoward interpretation of the Chandler Act,
further action by Congress to overcome such interpretations will
become essential.
Classes of creditors and stockholders admittedly must pre-
serve their ranks during reorganization, in the absence of reason
for subordination, so that elimination of some, in the event there
13 In Continental Ill. N. B. & T. Co. v. C. R. I. & P. R. Co., 294 U. S. 648 at 671.
55 S. Ct. 595, 79 L. Ed. 1110 at 1125 (1935). the court, commenting upon the several
bankruptcy statutes, said: "Taken altogether, they demonstrate in a very striking
way the capacity of the bankruptcy clause to meet new conditions as they have been
disclosed as a result of the tremendous growth of business and development of
human activities from 1800 to the present day. And these acts, far-reaching though
they may be, have not gone beyond the limit of congressional power; but rather
have constituted extensions into a field whose boundaries may not yet be fully
revealed."
14 Chief Justice IWaite, speaking in Canada Southern R. R. Co. v. Gebhard, 109
U. S. 527 at 536, 3 S. Ct. 363. 27 L. Ed. 1020 at 1024 (1883), once said: "Every
member of a political community must necessarily part with some of the rights
which, as an individual, not affected by his relation to others, he might have re-
tained. Such concessions make up the consideration he gives for the obligations of
the body politic to protect him in life, liberty and property. Bankrupt laws, what-
ever may be the form they assume, are of that character."
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should not be enough assets to reach down to them after taking
care of senior classes in full, is inevitable. Proper appraisal of
all of the assets of the debtor, of the utmost importance in order
that the readjustment be fair and equitable in fact, therefore
becomes a matter of paramount concern. Such appraisal should
reveal not only what the debtor owes but also what it owns. The
former may be a question of law, but the latter involves considera-
tions of both law and fact hence the guidance of practical business
judgment in valuing intangibles such as good will, business
policies, management and the like should not be disregarded.
Creditors faced with the stark reality that a demand for complete
payment, either in money or property, would be futile realize
that payment may eventually be had only from securities which
will be made good or redeemed by the labor and skill of the
managing stockholders of the debtor. As participation by the
latter is permissible only if it can be said they have contributed
money or money's worth to the reorganized debtor, 15 it would
seem to be implied that if sufficient of the creditors are willing to
allow such participation then they must have appraised the
intangible benefit arising from a continuity of management as
being equal to the value of that participation even though it might
not find record in the balance sheet set up by accountants for the
new company. Their practical business judgment, evidenced by
the record of their acceptance of a proposed plan allowing for
such participation, should not be lightly disregarded because some
judge may feel that the rule of priority, whether "strict" or not,
is being disregarded. It is not a case of taking from the "haves"
in order to give gratuitously to the "have-nots," highly objection-
able though that may be in a free capitalistic society, for recogni-
tion is being given to all of the values which are to be found in a
modern corporate enterprise.
If the liquidation were a simple case in which only cash was
to be distributed, it would not be difficult to pay the money out
15 Marine Harbor Properties, Inc. v. Mfrs. Trust Co., 317 U. S. 78, 63 S. Ct. 93.
87 L. Ed. 64 (1942), rehearing den. 317 U. S. 710, 63 S. Ct. 254, 87 L. Ed. 566 (1942) ;
In re Utilities Power & Light Corporation, 29 F. Supp. 763 (1939). A necessity for
such new contribution must be shown according to In re Associated Owners, Inc..
32 F. Supp. 828 (1940).
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according to the relative standings of the parties. When re-
organization operates to parcel out future prospects, however,
any oversimplification may produce a loss by ignoring certain of
these intangible values in order to protect bare legal rights. The
mere suggestion of prospective earning power brings in elements
and factors which cannot be confined by legal rules applied
without benefit of the experience of the business world. Business
men know that there is intangible value to be found merely in the
fact that the enterprise is functioning for it possesses an esprit
de corps that often cannot be replaced or rebuilt except with years
of effort. 16 While anticipated earning capacity can, at best, be
only a prediction and not a mathematical certainty, still the market
value of any property is measured by a prediction as to the use to
which it can be put and the profit apt to be derived therefrom. A
total valuati6n of the physical assets of the enterprise taken
without regard to its earning capacity would be inadequate not
only to determine the fairness and feasibility of a plan but also
to test the solvency of the debtor. If earning capacity is to be
considered at all, it should be a proper factor to be taken into
account for the purpose of allowing equity interests and manage-
ment to participate or else the proceedings will descend to the
level of a mere duel between conflicting groups with the auction
block conspicuously in view. Since anticipated profits help deter-
mine the value of an enterprise, the question then becomes one
as to who can make it earn the most. The experience and standing
of the old management is more likely to assure the obtaining of
profitable contracts by the debtor, so Justice Douglas' statement
that such intangibles reflect mere "vague hopes and possibili-
ties"' 7 which have no place in the assets column of a balance
sheet is, to say the least, unrealistic. Other judges, fortunately,
have felt otherwise.' s
16 Securities & Exch. Com. v. United States R. & Imp. Co.. 310 U. S. 434, 60 S. Ct.
1044, 84 L. Ed. 1293 (1940).
17 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 308 U. S. 106 at 123, 60 S. Ct. 1,
84 L. Ed. 110 at 123 (1939).
18 In Securities & Exch. Com. v. United States R. & Imp. Co., 310 U. S. 434 at 454,
60 S. Ct. 1044, 84 L. Ed. 1293 at 1303 (1940), the court said: "In cases where
subordinate creditors or the stockholders are the managers of its business, the
preservation of going-concern value through their continued management of the
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If it be felt that such participation would be unfair to the
rights of minority groups of preferred creditors, whether silent
non-acceptors or even articulate objectors, it should be remem-
bered that the judge, by reason of the requirement that the plan
obtain judicial approval, is in a position to see to it that the
participation granted is not the product or result of oppression
brought to bear on minority interests. The problem is more
likely to be one of protecting majority groups from striking or
recalcitrant minorities. If liquidation is the objective, dissidence
of the minority is not serious. But where the majority wish to
save the business along with its good will and other intangibles,
control over minorities is essential. The services of the Securities
and Exchange Commission are available for it was never intended
that that body should be assigned merely the task of reading
audits and appraisals of physical properties. There is nothing
startling in the proposition that creditors may yield some part of
their claims in order to salvage the greater part thereof. The
minority group, in the absence of constitutional definitions of
property and the manner by which it is to be valued, can only
contend that they cannot be deprived of property rights without
just compensation. If that compensation is provided in the form
the intangible values they are, in the absence of fraud or oppres-
sion, left without basis for complaint.
In the present status of the law, the fact that a plan has been
accepted by a large majority of the interested groups is said to be
no adequate test of its fairness and equitability. Justice Douglas
seemed to have feared that to permit such fact to have weight
would make the court into a "mere ministerial registry of the
vote of the several classes of security holders."' 19 Such vote is,
business may compensate for reduction of the claims of the prior creditors without
alteration of the management's interests, which would otherwise be required by the
Boyd case." The spirit of the decisions in Ecker v. Western Paoiflc R. Corp., 318
U. S. 448, 63 S. Ct. 692, 87 L. Ed. 892 (1943), and Consolidated Rock Products Co.
v. DuBois, 312 U. S. 510. 61 S. Ct. 675, 85 L. Ed. 982 (1941), would also seem to
conflict with that displayed in the Los Angeles Lumber Products Co. case.
19 Case v. Los Angeles Lumber Products Co., 30S U. S. 106 at 114, 60 S. Ct. 1,
84 L. Ed. 110 at 119 (1939). In Metropolitan Holding Co. v. Weadock, 113 F. (2d)
207 at 209, the majority of the court, per Hicks, C. J.. indicated that despite the fact
that the plan had had the approval not only of the Public Trust Commission of
Michigan but of the requisite percentage of the bondholders. still this was "not a
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of course, not the only test but it is idle to say that it should not
be a strong element for there would be no good reason for requir-
ing such a large percentage of acceptances nor the setting up of
elaborate machinery to safeguard the voting if it were not to
possess some weight. While the vote is not a substitute for the
judicial finding of fairness, it is one of the many facts helpful to
the court when asked to exercise its discretion. The more that
discretion is exercised without being fettered by archaic and
inappropriate rules, the less likely it will be that the court will
become a mere "ministerial registry." Judicial consideration of
the fact of creditor approval will no more make the court a mere
registry than does the parade of witnesses to and from the stand
make the trial judge a mere comptometer of witnesses to become
an umpire only if there is an equal number on both sides of the
case. The right to vote in a truly democratic manner is not a vain
exercise and creditors might well take issue with the statement
that their acceptance of a plan, predicated upon their own self-
interested determination that it is one most likely to succeed, is
of no value in fixing its fairness and feasibility. The more learned
the court be in academic legal theories, as distinguished from the
possession of sound practical business experience, the more weight
it should accord to the ideas of the interested participants.
The rules of economics are no more malleable than those of
any other science. The holder of municipal bonds must accept
the reality that he can look only to the taxing power and the
ability to pay taxes for payment of his claims.20  He cannot put
the municipality out of business. The farmer's creditor knows
that his rights may have to yield, under Section 75, to the right
test of fairness." Italics added. Simons, C. J., dissented on the ground that while
the court was "not bound by the consent of the bondholders, nor by the approval of
the plan by state or federal commissions, the self-interest that induces the former
and the opportunity for detailed investigation that leads to the latter, make them
highly persuasive of the fair and equitable character of the plan." From "not the
only test" of Justice Douglas, the phrase descends to "not a test" in the case noted.
Is this not reminiscent of what Justice Frankfurter complained about in Faitoute
Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park, 316 U. S. 502 at 513, 62 S. Ct. 1129, 86 L. Ed. 1629
at 1637 (1942), when he criticized a statement as "one of those inaccurate generali-
zations that has gained momentum from uncritical repetition."
20 11 U. S. C. A. § 401 et seq. See also Faitonte Iron & Steel Co. v. Asbury Park,
316 U. S. 502, 62 S. Ct. 1129, 86 L. Ed. 1629 (1942).
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of the farmer to retain his land at present values even though
the farmer's proposal lacks the good faith and feasibility required
in corporate reorganizations. 2' There is recognition in such
situations of a public interest that is being subserved by the
prevention of unnecessary deflation and of the damage caused by
liquidation that is too long delayed. While private corporations
are not legislative favorites, there is the same real disservice being
done to them and their creditors by the insistence upon bare legal
rights without regard to the eventualities of actual loss. Real
progress will be made, in a field the boundaries of which have
not yet been fully revealed, when it is thought safe and proper
to re-establish the parties in interest in control of the debtor's
property, even during reorganization, and when recognition is
given to the intangible values provided by continued management.
In the interest of true conservation of assets and genuineness of
rehabilitation, it is hoped that time will come soon.
21 11 U. S. C. A. 20:3. ;ee also .Johi llanock Mnt. I. Ins. (Cu. v. Bartels. :S
U. S. 180. 60 S. Ct. 221. 84 L. Ed. 176 (1939).
